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CONNECTICUT v. MOONEY AND 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: THE DOUBLE· 
EDGED SWORD OF ADVOCACY FOR THE 
HOMELESS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We have reached that point in our society's evolution where, in 
order to extend Fourth Amendment protection to the homeless to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of their personal 
property, we must also recognize our society's acceptance of the 
existence and conditions of homelessness. In granting an expecta-
tion of privacy to a homeless man, the Supreme Court of Connect-
icut, in Connecticut v. Mooney,l has broken new ground in defining 
the constitutional rights of the homeless. On the other hand, the 
court has perhaps pushed the homeless into an even more precar-
ious position by finding that society has accepted homelessness as a 
cultural norm. Connecticut v. Mooney, a case of first impression, seeks 
to clarify a fine point of constitutional law in that it further defines 
Fourth Amendment protection;2 unfortunately, establishing a the-
oretical right for the homeless to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure does little for the day-to-day plight of the homeless. 3 
1588 A.2d 145 (Conn.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991). 
2 [d. at 149. 
3 Congress has defined the homeless as: 
1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and 
2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is-
a) a supervised ... shelter designed to provide temporary living accommodations 
b) ... a temporary residence for individuals intended to be institutionalized; 
or 
c) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular 
sleeping accommodation for human beings. 
Steward B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (1988). See also Donald 
E. Baker, Comment, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the Homeless, 
45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 420 n.12 (1991). 
Aside from housing or shelter, the homeless require assistance with a variety of needs: 
health care; food and other basic subsistence items; assistance in substance abuse; drug 
therapy; psychological counseling; employment assistance, job training, and counseling; and 
child-care assistance. See Baker, supra, at 420 n.12. 
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Although the courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment4 to 
protect people and their privacy, and not simply their property, 
from unreasonable search and seizure, the Connecticut ruling was 
the first5 in which the highest court of a state applied these rights 
to the personal belongings left at "home" by a homeless person.6 
Because the court's decision in Mooney was so tied to the par-
ticular circumstances of the case,' Part II, Section A, of this Note 
examines the facts upon which the court based its decision. Section 
B explains the various analyses the court used to assess whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy could be found, first by looking 
at the area that the defendant wished protected, and second by 
looking at the containers that the defendant desired protected. 
Section C explores the rationale of the dissenting opinion in Mooney. 
Part III compares and contrasts the majority opinion with the dis-
sent. Part IV, Section A, examines the perspective of homeless rights 
activists on the legal rights established by Mooney. Section B discusses 
"anti-homeless" legislation as a general trend. Section C looks at 
current trends in establishing rights of the homeless. Finally, in Part 
V, this Note concludes that Mooney, although correctly decided,S 
4 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
u.s. CONST. amend. IV. 
5 Though the Mooney case was the first to put the issues under such a thorough analysis 
and to find that Fourth Amendment protection applied to the facts of the case, it was not 
the first case to address the issue of Fourth Amendment prohibition of warrantless searches 
of the public places that the homeless occupy. United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 
(10th Cir. 1986), considered the constitutionality of a warrantless search of a natural cave on 
federal lands in which a homeless man had lived for eight months. The Ruckman court found 
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the facts of that case because the cave was 
accessible to the public and because the defendant was a trespasser on federal lands. [d. at 
1472-73. 
6 A Home Under the Highway, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1991, at A20. 
7 When faced with a legal issue in the criminal context, courts will sometimes narrow 
their holdings by focusing as much as possible on the particular facts of the case. See, e.g., 
United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 863 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988), modified on other 
grounds, 897 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding was "purposefully narrow [and) fact-specific"); 
United States v. Earley, 816 F.2d 1428, 1446 (10th Cir. 1987) (court "duly and properly 
limited [cases) to their narrow holdings. In turn and as would be expected, its holding also 
was narrow and limited to the facts before it."); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668-
69 (6th Cir. 1977) ("We wish to emphasize the narrowness of this holding."). See generally 
Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process of 'Factualization' in the 
Search and Seizure Cases," 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 437-39 (1986); Francis A. Allen, The Wolf 
Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1,3-5 (1950). 
8 For commentary taking issue with this Note's conclusion that the Connecticut court 
correctly decided Mooney, compare Peter Mancini, Discourse, Mooney and Privacy: Some Tough 
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further indicates a turn in society's attitude toward the homeless. 
This turn in attitude will do more harm than good if society's 
recognition of homelessness and its conditions results in eventual 
indifference to its problems or in disillusionment in finding its 
solutions. 
II. CONNECTICUT V. MOONEY, A CASE DESCRIPTION 
David Mooney, a homeless man, was tried for felony murder9 
and robbery in the first degree. 1o During his trial, Mooney filed a 
motion to suppress certain evidence that the police had obtained 
from a search of his duffel bag and a cardboard box that he had 
kept in his "home," an area under a bridge. ll The trial court denied 
Mooney's motion, thus allowing into court evidence obtained from 
the search of his personal property that ultimately linked Mooney 
to the murder and robbery.12 Mooney was convicted,13 and he sub-
sequently brought an appeal. 14 The Supreme Court of Connecticut 
held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress 
Questions, 72 B.D. L. REV. 425 (1992) (concluding court erred in finding any expectation of 
privacy in Mooney's unattended belongings), with Kevin Royer, Discourse, The Mooney Blues: 
Homelessness and Constitutional Security from Unreasonable Searches, 72 B.D. L. REv. 443 (1992) 
(concluding court erred in not granting Mooney expectation of privacy in his non-traditional 
homeless residence). 
9 Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 149 (Conn. 1991). See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 53a-54c (West 1985). 
10 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-134(a)(I) (West 1985). 
11 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149. 
12ld. 
13 Mooney was sentenced to 50 years in prison. He remained in custody at the state's 
maximum-security prison at Somers throughout the appeal process. See Sean P. Murphy, 
Ruling Recognizes Privacy Rights of Homeless: Connecticut Court Throws Out Murder Conviction, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 19, 1991, at 19, 21; Kirk Johnson, Property of a Homeless Man is Private, 
Hartford Court Says, N.V. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at Bl, B6. The State opted to accept a plea 
bargain for first-degree manslaughter rather than risk conducting a new trial without the 
excluded evidence. As a result, David Mooney will be eligible for release from prison late in 
1992 after having served five years. Joseph Calve, Manslaughter Agreement Will Free Homeless 
Man, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1992, at 8; Homeless Man Convicted of Murder is to be Freed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1992, at B5. 
14 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149. Mooney's appeal actually contained four separate claims: 1) 
a motion to suppress evidence gathered from the challenged search and seizure; 2) a motion 
to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; 3) a request that certain evidence regarding an alleged 
larceny occurring subsequent to the murder be declared inadmissible; and 4) a request for 
access to mental health records of a prosecution witness. ld. The court, however, found no 
merit in the latter three claims for various procedural reasons. ld. at 161-71. This Note 
confines itself to an analysis of Mooney's first claim for suppression of evidence obtained in 
the search and seizure of his personal property; the other three claims fall outside the scope 
of this Note. 
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the evidence referred to in' Mooney's claim. 15 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the lower court's judgment 
and remanded the case for a new trial. I6 
A. Facts of the Case 
For about a month prior to his arrest,17 David Mooney, an 
unemployed carpenter,18 had been living under a highway bridge 
abutment by the State Street entrance ramp to route 1-91 in New 
Haven, Connecticut, a piece of property owned by the state. 19 A 
steep, crushed stone embankment and heavy underbrush separated 
the area in which Mooney lived from the 1-91 entrance ramp.20 For 
about two weeks before setting up his home under the bridge, 
Mooney had lived beside a fence near the Trumbull Street entrance 
to 1-91.21 When another homeless man moved in nearby, Mooney 
left that location and moved to the bridge abutment at the State 
Street area, presumably for reasons of privacy.22 
As the court noted, the jury could reasonably have found the 
following facts. 23 On July 30, 1987, David Mooney took Mark 
Allen,24 to whom Mooney owed money for drugs, to the Branford, 
Connecticut, condominium of Theodore Genovese, with whom 
Mooney claimed to have had a homosexual relationship.25 They 
visited the condominium to steal personal property from Genovese; 
Mooney planned to then pay his debt to Allen with the stolen 
property.26 Mooney told Allen to play along with the homosexual 
ploy as a cover for Allen's gaining entry into Genovese's home.27 
15Id. at 149. 
16Id. at 171. 
17 [d. at 151. 
18 A Home Under the Highway, supra note 6, at A20. 
19 Mooney, 588 A.2d at ISO. 
2°Id. Mooney's attorney, Emanuel Margolis-a partner at the Stamford, Connecticut, 
law firm of Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, and then-chair of the Connecticut Civil 
Liberties Union who took over the case on appeal on a pro bono basis--at oral argument 
brandished photographs of Mooney's "home" under the 1-91 bridge and asserted that the 
area was "almost impossible" to reach due to its physical characteristics. Joseph Calve, Does 
the Fourth Amendment Protect the Homeless?, N.J. L.J., Oct. 18, 1990, at 9. 
21 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 151. 
22Id. 
23Id. at 149. 
24 Mark Allen was tried and convicted as an accomplice to the crimes in separate pro-
ceedings. See Connecticut v. Allen, 579 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 1990). . 
25 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149. See also Murphy, supra note 13, at 19,21. 
26 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 149. 
27 See id. 
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When Mooney and Allen arrived at the condominium, Genovese 
invited them in and offered them drinks. 28 Mooney and the victim 
took a shower together, and after a certain amount of sexual contact, 
Mooney began beating Genovese.29 Allen pulled Mooney off the 
victim, but then left the bedroom to search the condominium for 
items to steal. 30 Mooney then killed Genovese by strangling him 
with a cord.31 Allen fled the condominium, taking with him coins, 
a VCR, and other items, and stole the victim's car.32 Genovese's 
body was discovered on the floor of the bedroom the next day.33 
The police arrested Allen in connection with Genovese's mur-
der on August 5, 1987.34 Allen admitted to being in the condomin-
ium on the day of the murder and to stealing the various items, 
but denied involvement in the murder.35 In statements to the police, 
Allen implicated Mooney in Genovese's murder; the police subse-
quently obtained an arrest warrant for Mooney and took him into 
custody on the night of August 5, 1987.36 
At the hearing on Mooney's motion to suppress, the parties 
disclosed the following factsY While Mooney was in custody follow-
ing his arrest, Detective Anthony Morro of the Branford Police 
Department met Mooney's girlfriend, Linda Spencer, at her place 
of employment shortly after midnight on August 6th.38 Morro asked 
Spencer to take him to the place where Mooney had been living at 
the time of the murder, which she did.39 Morro, after scrambling 
up the embankment, searched the area and found a blanket that 
Mooney used as a mattress, a sleeping bag, a closed cardboard box, 
a suitcase, a closed duffel bag, and some trash.40 To shield them 
from public sight, Mooney had placed all the items up on the metal 
and cement beams of the highway support structure-using the 
beams as shelves-with the exception of the blanket, duffel bag, 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
30 [d. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
33 [d. 
34 [d. at 150. Allen's arrest followed the police's discovery that Allen was in possession of 
some of the murder victim's property, including his car. [d. at 150-51. 
35 [d. at 150. 
36 [d. 
37 [d. 
38 [d. 
39 [d. 
40 [d. 
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and trash, which were lying on the ground.41 Detective Morro 
opened the duffel bag and found a paper bag inside that contained 
around $700 in coins.42 
Rather than search any of the other items at that time, Morro 
contacted the Branford police evidence officer43 and requested that 
he come to the scene; the police then tagged the various items and 
took them to the police department where they were opened and 
searched.44 The State subsequently submitted into evidence a size 
38 belt that had been in the cardboard box; they also submitted the 
coins, a pair of bloodstained white pants, and pieces of jewelry, all 
of which had been in the duffel bag.45 Aside from the belt, which 
Mooney asserted belonged to a drinking companion, Mooney 
claimed ownership of all the items.46 
At the trial, the State succeeded in connecting Mooney to Gen-
ovese's murder by introducing the items that the police had seized 
from Mooney's closed containers-including the white, blood-
stained pants and the size 38 belt (the same size as that worn by the 
victim).47 Allen identified48 the pants as those worn by Mooney on 
the day of the murder.49 
Trial testimony also determined that during the month that 
Mooney lived under the bridge abutment, he was the sole occupant 
of the area. 50 Mooney slept at the site in the evenings51 and would 
leave the area daily, but not before securing his belongings in the 
same manner in which the police had found them-up on the 
girders, so that people at the bottom of the embankment could not 
41 See id. at 150-51. 
42Id . 
.. Duties of evidence officers can vary gready from precinct to precinct. Generally, they 
are specially trained to handle and preserve evidence at a crime scene so as not to lose the 
evidence or to contaminate its evidentiary value. Telephone interview with George Kelling, 
Professor, College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University, Boston, Mass., and Fellow, 
Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 9, 1992). 
"Mooney, 588 A.2d at 150-51. 
45 See id. at 151. 
46Id. 
47Id. The State offered other items taken from the closed containers, including the coins, 
to connect Mooney with a subsequent robbery of another homosexual man. Id. at 151-52. 
This evidence concerned the basis of Mooney's third claim in his appeal and falls outside the 
scope of this Note. See id. at 152; see also supra note 14. 
48 Because his testimony was required to connect Mooney to the robbery and murder of 
Genovese, Allen was an essential witness to the State's case. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 162 n.20. 
49Id. at 151. 
50 Id. 
51Id. 
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see them. 52 Though hiding the items in this manner afforded a 
degree of privacy, Mooney acknowledged that not only had a high-
way worker clearing brush stumbled upon him, but also that there 
was always the possibility that someone else could enter the state-
owned area.53 Faced with these facts, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court turned to an analysis of constitutional law to determine 
whether David Mooney could legitimately claim Fourth Amend-
ment protection against the search and seizure of his personal prop-
erty. 
B. The Majority Opinion 
Though Mooney based his claim on both the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7, of 
the Connecticut state constitution, the court limited its consideration 
to Mooney's claim under the United States Constitution.54 Mooney 
5'ld. 
5'ld. 
54 State supreme courts generally have the responsibility to decide federal constitutional 
issues when they are raised in cases arising within their jurisdictions. Cases will often raise a 
constitutional issue based both on the United States Constitution as well as the constitution 
of the particular state. State supreme courts will sometimes opt to confine their holdings to 
the federal constitutional question, thereby enabling the parties to appeal to the federal 
courts and sending the question up the judicial hierarchy for continued clarification of the 
law. By specifically declining to decide the case on the state constitutional basis, the court 
leaves open the possibility, in the event that a higher court overturns the United States 
Constitutional issue and remands for further proceedings, of obtaining the same result on a 
state constitutional basis. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). 
[T]he point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest when they have 
afforded their citizens the full protection of the federal Constitution. State consti-
tutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protection often extending 
beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The 
legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to 
inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for without it, the full real-
ization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. 
Id. at 491. 
Although Mooney raised both a Federal Fourth Amendment claim and a state consti-
tutional claim against the search and seizure of his personal property, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court expressly declined to address the state constitutional claim because Mooney 
had "offer[ed] no separate analysis thereunder. [The court] therefore decline[d] to consider 
his claim under the Connecticut constitution." Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 150 
n.5 (Conn. 1991). Mooney's attorney on appeal, Emanuel Margolis, said that he provided no 
separate analysis for the state constitutional claim because "he simply couldn't forsake his 
client's stronger arguments in favor of the kind of full-blown state constitutional analysis the 
court demands-not with a 35-page limit on the brief." Joseph Calve, Homeless Ruling: Privacy 
in Possessions, Not Place, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 25, 1991, at 1. 
After Mooney succeeded in his appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the State 
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made two claims in his appeal. First, he alleged that the police 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they invaded his 
"home" without a warrant-a claim based on his condition of home-
lessness.55 Second, he asserted a narrower claim that he had a rea-
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied certiorari, 112 S. Ct. 
330 (1991), probably because the Supreme Court tends to grant certiorari when there is a 
conflict on a legal question between federal courts and state supreme courts, a factor missing 
from the Mooney case. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE §§ 4.3-4.10 
(6th ed. 1986). 
As additional cases, which raise the same constitutional question as Mooney, move through 
the courts, it is likely that various courts will reach disparate findings. The issue will then be 
ripe for consideration by the United States Supreme Court. See id. 
55 In Connecticut, at the time of the Mooney decision, there were an estimated 30,000 
homeless people. This number totalled more than the populations of 140 of the state's 169 
cities and towns. David Margolick, Poverty and Privacy: Home, Sweet Niche?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 1990, at 25. As the following excerpt illustrates, the make-up of the homeless population 
has changed: 
Difficulty in counting the homeless makes it clear that the days when "homeless" 
meant exclusively bag lady and "skid road [sic] alcoholic" have ended. While these 
people do make up a part of the homeless population, other homeless groups include 
families evicted for nonpayment of rent, battered women, individuals and families 
displaced by condominium conversion and urban renewal, the elderly, deinstitu-
tionalized mental patients who have not been provided community-based mental 
health services, and the unemployed .... It is not possible any longer to describe 
the homeless population in brief. The homeless population is made up of an in-
creasing number of minorities and women. The homeless populations in various 
sizes and kinds of communities differ, with a number of smaller communities re-
porting that the majority of their homeless are younger and have roots in the 
area .... Clearly, today's homeless are coming from an increasingly wide range of 
backgrounds. 
Linda S. Dakin, Homelessness: The Role of the Legal Profession in Finding Solutions Through 
Litigation, 21 FAM. L.Q. 93, 97, 101-02 (1987). 
As the homeless population has changed, so has its plight: 
The plight of the homeless, regardless of the region of the United States where 
they are found, is dire. Daily life is a continual struggle to gain the minimal resources 
needed to survive. The exigencies of everyday life for the homeless turn on these 
essential needs: a safe place to sleep, sufficient food and access to toilet and sanitary 
facilities .... [I]n most ... cities, the pattern is simple: where refuge can be found 
or fashioned, it is being used .... The effects of homelessness are not difficult to 
fathom. Insecurity and persistent vigilance take their toll. It matters little where 
shelter is ultimately found, whether "on the grates, or in an abandoned building, 
sleep is invariably fitful or brief or both. Exhaustion becomes the day's constant 
companion .... To remain awake, hour after hour, when the body and mind are 
crying out for rest, is sheer torture." 
Robert M. Hayes, The Rights of the Homeless, in 331 LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. SERIES 441, 447-
49 (1987) (quoting MARY ELLEN HOMBS & MITCH SNYDER, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A 
FORCED MARCH TO NOWHERE III (1982». 
For an in-depth look at current homelessness issues, see generally James K. Langdon, 
II & Mark A. Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J.L. & 
Soc. PROBS. 305 (1985); Donna Mascari, Homeless Families: Do They Have a Right to Integrity', 
35 UCLA L. REv. 159 (1987). 
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sonable expectation of privacy in his duffel bag and cardboard box, 
which were located under the bridge abutment, and that the police 
violated his privacy when they searched through his personal effects 
without first obtaining a search warrant. 56 
In Connecticut, as elsewhere, successful invocation of Fourth 
Amendment protection requires a defendant to establish that the 
area the defendant wishes protected can support a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy. 57 Courts take a case-by-case approach to de-
termine whether this expectation legitimately exists.58 The Con-
necticut Supreme Court used a two-part inquiry to determine 
whether Mooney could establish a legitimate expectation of privacy: 
"first, whether the individual has exhibited an actual subjective 
expectation of privacy, and second, whether that expectation is one 
society recognizes as reasonable."59 The court acknowledged that 
Mooney had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy through 
his actions.60 The question therefore became whether Mooney could 
establish the second prong of the test, namely, an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The 
court looked at cases that made "fact-specific inquir[ies ],,61 into 
places that were searched to determine whether the defendants' 
expectations of privacy were reasonable.62 
Propounding a theme from United States v. Taborda,63 to which 
it would repeatedly refer, the Connecticut Supreme Court empha-
sized that for a place to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
"society [must be] prepared, because of its code of values and its 
notions of custom and civility, to give deference to a manifested 
56 Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152 (Conn. 1991). 
57 [d.; see also Connecticut v. Reddick, 541 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Conn. 1988). 
58 Reddick, 541 A.2d at 1213. 
59 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152. 
60 "For these purposes, we accept the defendant's claim that he sufficiently manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the area and in the items seized to satisfy the first prong 
of the applicable [Fjourth [Ajmendment analysis. The trial court so concluded, and the 
[Sjtate does not seriously contend otherwise." Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152 n.9. 
61 See Connecticut v. Brown, 503 A.2d 566, 570 (Conn. 1986). 
62 These cases were Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (finding no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in open fields); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'gdenied, 439 
U.S. 1122 (1979) (examining the invaded place as a factor in determining reasonableness of 
expectation of privacy); and United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in cave on public land in which defendant 
lived). 
63 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding identifying items or activities inside a home 
by use of a telescope when those items or activities could not be identified from outside 
without the telescope impaired a legitimate expectation of privacy). 
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expectation of privacy."64 The court also indicated that this deter-
mination of what is reasonable may involve a balancing of conflicting 
interests.65 After establishing these initial concerns, the court then 
proceeded to examine, first, the broad claim of Fourth Amendment 
protection in the area under the bridge abutment, and, second, the 
narrower claim of Fourth Amendment protection in the duffel bag 
and cardboard box. 
1. Expectation of Privacy in the Bridge Abutment Area 
Mooney's broad claim of Fourth Amendment protection in the 
area in which he lived rested solely on his homelessness.66 Mooney 
argued that because he had "exclusive possession"67 of the area 
during the time he lived there, he was entitled to no less privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment than "more fortunate members of 
society" who happened to dwell in houses.68 The State countered 
that because the area in question falls under the "open fields doc-
trine,"69 and because Mooney was in effect a trespasser on state 
land7°-property accessible to anyone who happened along-the 
64 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 153 (emphasis added). 
65Id. (referring to Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984), in which the Court 
weighed the interest in the fundamental right to an expectation of privacy with society'S 
interest in the security of penal institutions, and found that society'S interest outweighed a 
prisoner's interest in privacy within his or her cell). 
66 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152; see supra note 55. 
67 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152. 
[Mooney 1 departed from the spot each morning to wash in a nearby reservoir, taking 
care not to be seen whenever he left. He left behind his Walkman, his cassettes and 
hundreds of dollars in coins he kept in his duffel bag-money, he said, that came 
from tips that his girlfriend earned at a nearby restaurant. His property was always 
undisturbed when he returned. 
Margolick, supra note 55, at 26. 
68 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152. 
69 In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
reached the conclusion that open fields outside the immediate enclosure of a dwelling house 
could not hold a reasonable expectation of privacy because of their open, visible nature, and 
therefore were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See generally Annotation, Supreme 
Court's Development of"open Fields Doctrine" with Respect to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure 
Protection, 80 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1984); see also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), and 
its progeny. See also infra text accompanying notes 84 & 106. 
70 Attorney Margolis, at oral argument, asserted that it was of no consequence that 
Mooney was on public property. Given the fact that the police located Mooney's living quarters 
while Mooney was in their custody, Margolis argued, the police acted improperly in not 
obtaining a warrant in light of the fact that there was plenty of time to get one. Otherwise, 
"a homeless individual too poor to afford a storage locker automatically waives all privacy 
claims to his diaries, letters, books, or other personal effects not in his immediate possession." 
Margolick, supra note 55, at 26; see also supra note 20. 
1993] EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND THE HOMELESS 97 
area was incapable of sustaining Mooney's asserted privacy inter-
est. 71 
The court stated that it did not need to decide whether the 
area under the bridge abutment could shelter a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy because the court had established a way to resolve 
the issue based on Mooney's other claim of reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his closed containers.72 Nevertheless, the court spent 
a great deal of effort analyzing the issue, and even went so far as 
to say that it assumed, as the State argued, that Fourth Amendment 
protection of the area must fail. 73 
The court identified two factors that render an area-in the 
eyes of society-not worthy of an expectation of privacy:74 where 
the person is a trespasser,75 and where the area is "readily accessible 
to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public."76 Though the court saw these factors as relevant, the court 
stated that they were merely "helpful guides" and were not to be 
"undertaken mechanistically" as "ends in themselves."77 The court 
insisted that society would consider all the circumstances of each 
case, including these factors, to determine if the expectation of 
privacy is reasonable. 78 
Because the court found for Mooney on the basis of the nar-
rower, closed container claim, it did not expressly decide whether 
Mooney's broad claim-that the area under the bridge was entitled 
to Fourth Amendment protection-was valid, although the court 
assumed that it was not. 79 By developing the discussion in the man-
ner that it did, however, the court left open the possibility that 
under a different fact-specific inquiry, it might find that a homeless 
71 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152. 
72 See id. 
73 [d. One possible explanation for why the court analyzed the issue as it did might be 
that because the holding is intimately tied to the fact-specific circumstances of the case, the 
court left open the possibility that another set of circumstances might allow it to find an 
expectation of privacy in a homeless person's "home." Even though the court found no merit 
in Mooney's claim of privacy in the bridge abutment area, the court's holding does not 
preclude its finding of a legitimate expectation of privacy in a future case. See infra note 237 
and accompanying text. 
74 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 153. 
75 United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1986); see supra note 5. 
76 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in garbage bags left for collection outside curtilage, meaning land surrounding house or 
dwelling). 
77 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 154 (quoting Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1476 (McKay, j., dissenting)). 
78 [d. 
79 [d. at 152. 
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person's "home" comes under Fourth Amendment protection from 
warrantless searches. 
2. Expectation of Privacy in the Containers 
Mooney's narrower claim that he maintained an expectation of 
privacy in the closed containers, namely the duffel bag and card-
board box, found merit with the court. 80 The court held that 
the [F]ourth [A]mendment applie[d] to the unique factual cir-
cumstances of this case, where the closed containers were found 
by the police in a secluded place that they knew the defendant 
regarded as his home, where the defendant's absence from that 
place at the time of the search was due to his arrest and custody 
by the police, and where the purpose of the search was to obtain 
evidence of the crimes for which he was in custody.81 
Unlike Mooney's broader claim, his narrower claim did not rest 
solely on his homelessness; the narrower claim also relied on the 
nature of the containers and the circumstances surrounding their 
search.82 
Before reaching their holding, however, the court delineated 
what the claim did not involve: 1) claims of reasonable expectation 
of privacy in any of Mooney's effects except his duffel bag and 
cardboard box, from which the evidence used at trial was obtained;83 
2) claims of expectation of privacy of homeless people in goods and 
effects that they have on their person or "under [their] immediate 
control";84 3) claims for Fourth Amendment protection of goods 
and effects of all the homeless, regardless of circumstances;85 4) 
whether the police, with probable cause, were entitled to seize and 
preserve the containers while they secured the warrant;86 and 5) 
under what circumstances the police may search closed containers 
8°Id. 
81Id. at 155. 
82Id. at 154. 
83 [d. 
84 [d. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 n.l0 (1984), stands for the proposition 
that these effects would receive constitutional protection. See supra note 69. 
85 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 155. 
86Id. Because the trial court had found that Mooney had no Fourth Amendment claim 
under the circumstances of the case, the issue of probable cause to seize the containers was 
not adjudicated in the court below or before the appeals court. Id. at 155 n.ll. The Con-
necticut Supreme Court, however, assumed that the police could have seized the containers, 
upon probable cause that they contained evidence, in order to preserve them while the police 
obtained a search warrant. Id. at 155; see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984). 
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discovered in public places for purposes other than searching for 
evidence. 87 
a. Container cases 
Mooney relied on a line of cases establishing that when a person 
places personal effects inside luggage or other appropriately closed 
containers, the individual manifests an expectation of privacy in the 
contents of these containers. 88 The court addressed the tension 
inherent in the issue by balancing the deference typically afforded 
by society to privacy in appropriately closed containers against the 
principle that property left in public places generally cannot sustain 
Fourth Amendment protection.89 
The court examined a number of cases in which the defendants 
claimed to have had Fourth Amendment protection in their con-
tainers.9o The court concluded that the Fourth Amendment affords 
protection91 to containers that are intended as "repositor[ies] of 
personal effects."92 The "place" invaded, therefore, is the interior, 
or the contents.93 
Although the Connecticut court acknowledged that a broad 
reading of these cases would provide "conclusive support" of 
Mooney's claim, it chose not to rely on them.94 Instead, the court 
distinguished them because in each of the cases, when the chal-
lenged search occurred, the owner was either accompanying the 
container,95 the owner had entrusted the container to another for 
87 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 155. Examples that the court gave as other purposes were pre-
serving the property's safety or determining ownership. See, e.g., United States v. Sumlin, 
909 F.2d 1218 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 559 (1990) (finding no violation of expectation 
of privacy when police opened stolen handbag to determine ownership). 
88588 A.2d at 156. For cases illustrating this general principle, see infra notes 90-92 and 
accompanying text. Exceptions to this general principle are: when contents can be inferred 
from the outward appearance of the container; when the container is transparent; or when 
the container "otherwise clearly reveal[s] its contents." See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 
420,427 (1981). 
89 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 155. 
90 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (striking down warrantless search of 
footlocker seized from automobile at time of arrest); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) 
(holding that sealed packages in mail cannot be opened without warrant); Connecticut v. 
Edwards, 570 A.2d 193 (Conn. 1990) (holding that a backpack located in a temporary 
residence is protected from warrantless search). 
91 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 157. 
92 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. 
93 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 157. 
94 See id. at 158. 
95 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (suitcase was in trunk of defendant's 
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safekeeping or for another particular purpose,96 or the container 
was left in a place that had a reasonable expectation of privacy.97 
The court indicated, however, that although these cases do not 
compel a conclusion that Mooney had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of his box and bag, neither do they preclude 
such a conclusion.98 At this point, the court referred back to the 
tension it felt it must resolve, and tipped the scale in favor of 
society's "weighty interest" in the expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of luggage and other appropriately closed containers.99 
b. Abandonment cases 
The court then turned to a line of cases discussing abandoned 
property. Distinguishing the property law notion of abandonment 
(legal title or possessory interest abandonment), the court affirmed 
that abandonment in the search and seizure context is essentially 
the abandonment of the reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
property, not of the property itself. loo 
The court cited to a number of caseslOI to support the propo-
sition that it is relevant whether the defendant manifested by con-
duct an intent to "shed, albeit temporarily" the expectation of pri-
vacy in the property.I02 The court admitted that, at first glance, 
these cases uphold the State's arguments against Mooney's claim of 
privacy in his containers. lo3 As they had done with the line of 
container cases, however, the court insisted that the abandonment 
taxi); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (defendant was loading footlocker into 
trunk of car). 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (private freight carrier); United 
States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (United States mail); United States v. Barry, 853 
F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1988) (locked suitcase left with bailee at airport). 
97 E.g., Connecticut v. Edwards, 570 A.2d 193 (Conn. 1990) (backpack located at tem-
porary residence); see Mooney, 588 A.2d at 158. 
98 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 158. Indeed, the court stated that the cases "strongly suggest" 
just such a conclusion in Mooney's case. 
99 [d. 
100 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 158-59; see also St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370-71 
(Minn. 1975). 
101 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in trash bags left at curbside for trash collection); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 
843 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding no expectation of privacy in gym bag left in apartment building 
hallway); United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding suitcase buried under 
chicken coop on abandoned farm was discarded and therefore fell within open field doctrine). 
10. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159; see also Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-40; Thomas, 864 F.2d at 
845. 
103 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159. 
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cases do not compel the conclusion that Mooney retained no ex-
pectation of privacy in his duffel bag and cardboard box. 104 The 
court distinguished the abandonment cases from the facts of Mooney 
by noting, first, that none of the cases involved a homeless defen-
dant's luggage found in a secluded area that the police knew the 
defendant considered his home and that the police searched after 
the defendant was in custody; second, that none of the cases gave 
any indication that the defendants raised, or that the courts consid-
ered, the independent question of privacy rights in the interior of 
the containers; and third, that most of the abandonment cases 
involved an element of conduct on the part of the defendant that 
manifested the defendant's intent to relinquish an expectation of 
privacy in the luggage. 105 
Further, the court distinguished Mooney from United States v. 
Oliver because the Oliver court declared that open fields were not 
"effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,106 whereas 
effects were at issue in Mooney.107 The court also distinguished 
Mooney from California v. Greenwoodl08 on the simple principle that 
in Greenwood the defendants had exposed the property-trash 
bags-to the public by placing them at the curb for the express purpose 
of conveying them to a third party. 109 
The court made the further observation that the balancing of 
interests-society's fundamental interest in preserving the consti-
tutional right to privacy versus society's legitimate interest in law 
enforcement-tipped the scale in Mooney's favor. llo The court 
noted that there would have been "no significant impairment" of 
the law enforcement interest by requiring the police to obtain a 
search warrant before searching Mooney's effects. 1 11 
In its summary, the court returned to the question of whether, 
under the fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances of Mooney's 
I04Id. 
105Id. The court did not identify, however, which cases did or did not involve conduct 
that manifested a defendant's intent to relinquish any expectation of privacy. 
106 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984); see supra notes 69 & 84. 
107 588 A.2d at 160. "The right of the people to be secure in their ... effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
108 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
109 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 160. It is important to note that the Court in Greenwood did not 
rely on abandonment principles, but rather relied on exposure to the public. 486 U.S. at 40-
41. Nevertheless, the majority in Mooney discussed Greenwood in the context of the abandon-
ment cases, as did, subsequently, the minority. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 172 n.2. 
110 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 161. 
IIIId. 
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case, society would be prepared, by virtue of its code of values and 
notions of custom and civility, to grant Mooney an expectation of 
privacy in his duffel bag and box. The court concluded that, given 
the conditions of homelessness and the other circumstances in 
Mooney's case, notions of custom and civility dictated that society 
was indeed ready to take such a step.112 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting judges did not support the majority's holding 
that Mooney could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
belongings under the bridge. ll3 First, the dissent explained its 
agreement with the majority's assessment that there was no expec-
tation of privacy in the abutment area. I 14 The dissent, citing exten-
sive authority, 115 emphasized that what has been knowingly exposed 
to, or is readily accessible to, the public does not carry any Fourth 
Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure. 116 
Because the public had ready access to the area under the bridge,ll7 
112 See id. at 160-61. 
113 Id. at 171 (Callahan, J., dissenting). Though they disagreed over Mooney's first claim, 
the dissenters agreed with the majority that Mooney's last three claims had no merit. See 
supra note 14. 
114 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 171 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
115 The dissent cited the following cases to support the contention that the area was 
readily accessible to the public: California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (no 
protection for what is readily accessible to public); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-
14 (1986) (no protection for what is readily observable by aerial surveillance); Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (no protection in open field); United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (no protection in movement over public road that was readily 
viewable); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (no protection for what is knowingly 
exposed to public). The dissent then cited to the following cases to support its trespasser 
argument: United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1986) (no privacy 
interest in natural cave on federal land); Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (lst 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976) (no privacy interest for squatters on public land). 
116 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 171-72 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
117 The dissent made reference to a newspaper article, Anthropologist-In-Training Tracks 
the City's Homeless, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 12, 1990, at AI, A6, as support for their 
contention that accessibility to the public negates any homeless person's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. The article featured an anthropology student who searched through be-
longings and makeshift residences of the homeless when he knew the homeless person was 
absent. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 172 n.l (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
Carrying the dissent's argument through to its logical conclusion, would it not be possible 
to cite to the numerous reportings in the press of break-ins and burglaries of private homes 
and offices as an indication that reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas has been 
eviscerated? Or perhaps it would at least be possible to conclude that the anthropology 
student himself violated the homeless people's right to privacy by first rummaging through 
their belongings and then publicizing the details in the media. 
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and because the State viewed Mooney as a trespasser on state prop-
erty, the dissenting judges concluded that Mooney could have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy there. ll8 
In turning to the issue of whether Mooney could have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the containers, the dissenting 
judges asserted that this issue was closely linked to whether Mooney 
could have had any expectation of privacy in the abutment area 
itself when he left the containers there. llg Unwilling to separate the 
container issue from the area issue, the dissent concluded that 
because Mooney had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
area under the bridge, he could not have had any legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in anything he left there unattended, whether 
a closed container or not. 120 Finding no support for adding a "cir-
cumstances of the searched" prong to the analysis, the dissent dis-
missed the fact-specific circumstances of Mooney's case that the 
majority used to distinguish his situation from the line of abandon-
ment cases. 121 
The dissent strongly criticized the majority's reliance on the 
purpose of the police search as a factor in the analysis. '22 Citing 
Scott v. United States,123 the dissent argued that police motive is 
irrelevant in determining the reasonableness of a search, and that 
the standard is an objective, not a subjective, one. 124 Additionally, 
the dissent indicated that the majority's focus on Mooney's inability 
to assert his Fourth Amendment rights because of his arrest implies 
that the majority was concerned with a pretextual arrest for the 
purpose of searching the abutment area. 125 The dissent found this 
concern flawed for the same reason that they found the purpose of 
the search argument flawed-motive is irrelevant as to whether 
expectation of privacy is reasonable. 126 
The dissent seemed puzzled by how the majority distinguished 
the line of abandonment cases from the facts of the Mooney case by 
asserting that the abandonment cases focused on the areas in which 
118 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 172 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
119 [d. (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
120 See id. (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
121 [d. at 173 (Callahan, j., dissenting); see infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
122 See Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
123 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (finding police noncompliance with statutory requirement to 
minimize interference of communication not subject to investigation irrelevant in determining 
reasonableness of telephone wiretap interceptions). 
124 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
125 [d. at 174. 
126 [d. 
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those containers were found and not on the interiors of the con-
tainers themselves. 127 The dissent, however, repeated its conclusion 
that it did not see how the area analysis and container analysis could 
be distinguished, and therefore thought it axiomatic that when the 
abandonment cases considered the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the area, they were also considering any reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the interior of the containers. 128 
Lastly, the dissent took exception to the majority's use of intent 
to relinquish an expectation of privacy as a factor distinguishing 
Mooney's circumstances from the line of abandonment cases. 129 The 
dissenting judges reasoned that express or implied conduct indi-
cating relinquishment was not a condition necessary for a finding 
of no reasonable expectation of privacy.13o Further, according to 
the dissent, the express conduct of hiding a container in an area 
accessible to the public was insufficient in and of itself to support 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.131 This finding 
brought the dissent back to its original conclusion that the predom-
inant factor in assessing whether a privacy right had been relin-
quished by Mooney was the nature of the abutment area itself. 132 
The dissenters believed that, given the public nature of the abut-
ment area, Mooney could not have expected his belongings to re-
main safe from the public; therefore, the dissenters concluded, 
Mooney relinquished any privacy interest in his belongings when 
he left them behind. 133 
III. CONTRASTING THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY OPINIONS 
The majority and dissenting opinions, in essence, split on the 
issue of abandonment. Did Mooney, in voluntarily departing the 
area-concededly public property-and in leaving all his worldly 
goods behind, also voluntarily relinquish his expectation of privacy 
in those personal effects?134 The dissenting judges found no merit 
127 [d. at 174-75. 
128 [d. 
129 [d. at 175. 
UOJd. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. 
13. See id. 
134 See generally John P. Ludington, Annotation, Search and Seizure: What Constitutes Aban-
donment of Personal Property Within Rule That Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property is Not 
Unreasonable-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381 (1985). See also Edward G. Mascolo, The Role 
of Abandonment in the Law of Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. 
L. REv. 399 (1971). 
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in Mooney's claim because when they considered the abandonment 
issue they were unable to keep separate, as the majority opinion 
had done in its narrow, fact-specific holding, 135 Mooney's two claims: 
one for Fourth Amendment protection of the bridge abutment area 
and the other for Fourth Amendment protection of the closed 
containers. 136 
The dissent felt that because the area under the bridge was a 
public place, Mooney could have had neither a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the abutment area, nor, consequently, a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the closed containers he left there. 137 
The dissenting opinion did some fast backpedaling on this issue, 
however, albeit buried in a footnote: 138 the dissent acknowledged 
that some containers left unattended in an area to which the public 
has access may warrant Fourth Amendment protection. 139 Referring 
to Kelly v. Florida,140 a case in which a defendant was found to have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a backpack attached to a 
bicycle left for ten minutes in a public parking lot, the dissent 
inferred that the circumstances of the Kelly case made it so unlikely 
that the backpack would be disturbed that an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy might arise. l41 The dissent, however, did not 
provide any rationale as to why a backpack on a bicycle left for a 
short period of time in a public parking lot would warrant an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when a closed card-
board box hidden from sight under a bridge abutment, hoisted up 
on steel girders, for a longer period of time, would not. 142 
Since Mooney, other courts have decided cases differing in view-
point from the dissenters in Mooney. In one case that takes issue 
with the dissent's argument that a privacy interest in a closed con-
tainer cannot be separated from the expectation of privacy in the 
area in which the container is located, the court in Owens v. 
135 See Mooney, 588 A.2d at 160. The majority listed the four factors leading to its holding: 
1) place searched was the interior of a repository of personal effects; 2) police knew Mooney, 
as a homeless person, regarded the area as his home; 3) Mooney could not be at the area to 
assert Fourth Amendment rights because the police had placed him under arrest; and 4) the 
purpose of the search was to obtain evidence against Mooney rather than safeguard the 
containers or identify their owner. 
136 See id. at 171-72 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
137 [d. at 172. 
138 See id. at 172 n.3. 
139 [d. 
140 536 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. App. 1988). 
141 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 172-73 n.3 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
142 See id. (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
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Marylandl43 made an analytical distinction similar to that made by 
the majority in Mooney.144 In Owens, the defendant left his luggage 
in the apartment of an acquaintance. 145 The police arrived at the 
apartment in the defendant's absence and requested the acquain-
tance's permission to search the apartment and the luggage, both 
of which the acquaintance allowed even though the defendant had 
not given the acquaintance permission to open his luggage. 146 In 
ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained in 
the search of his luggage, the Supreme Court of Maryland held 
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the apartment, which, from the court's point of view, was acces-
sible to the public as far as the defendant was concerned. 147 The 
court went on to hold, as the Mooney court had done, that the 
defendant nevertheless had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of his luggage. 148 
In United States v. Scott,149 a Federal District Court elaborated 
on the California v. Greenwood proposition that what is readily ac-
cessible to the public has no reasonable expectation of privacy.15o 
In Greenwood, the United States Supreme Court held that trash bags 
left at the curb of a public street had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy because the bags were left there essentially to be conveyed 
to another party.151 In Scott, IRS agents seized the defendant's trash 
from the curb, found it shredded, and painstakingly reconstructed 
it.152 Using information obtained from the seized trash, the IRS 
obtained search warrants for the defendant's home where they 
found additional evidence that led to a grand jury indictment. 153 
143 589 A.2d 59 (Md.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 452 (1991). 
144 See 588 A.2d at 150. 
145 589 A.2d at 60. 
1461d. at 61. 
147 [d. at 64. 
1481d. at 65. The Owens court followed a similar line of closed container cases as the 
Mooney court. 
The presence of a gratuitous bailment, however, also factored into the Owens court's 
consideration in determining that society would deem this expectation reasonable. ld. Gra-
tuitous bailment results when care and custody of a person's property is accepted by someone 
without charge and without any expectation of compensation. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 38 
(2d ed. 1984). 
149 776 F. Supp. 629 (D. Mass. 1991). This case is entirely different than Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), discussed by both the majority and dissent in Mooney. 
150 [d. at 631; see supra notes 101-02, 109, 115 and accompanying text. 
151 485 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
152 776 F. Supp. at 630. 
15> ld. The defendants were indicted for filing false tax claims. ld. 
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Although the defendant exposed the trash to the public for the 
express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the Scott court 
found that society would recognize as reasonable an expectation of 
privacy in deliberately shredded documents. 154 While the court re-
lied on case law supporting the proposition that an individual has 
a privacy interest in shredded documents,155 the court also consid-
ered what society would take into account as "common knowl-
edge"-the equivalent of what the Mooney court called "notions of 
custom and civility"-in explaining both its and the Greenwood de-
cisions. 156 
The dissenting judges in Mooney would perhaps have been 
willing to concede that the circumstances of the items and the public 
area may be considered in finding an objectively reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. 157 The majority, however, took the analysis of the 
circumstances one step further, specifically taking into consideration 
Mooney's homeless state. 158 The minority reasoned that relying on 
Mooney's homelessness would create a situation in which a homeless 
person leaving items at "home" would receive greater Fourth 
Amendment protection than someone who had a home but placed 
articles under the bridge abutment for other purposes. 159 One won-
ders at the irony of the dissent's reasoning; it ignores the fact that 
the person with the home could simply leave the item at home and 
claim the same privileges the dissent argued they would be denied 
under the bridge abutment, an option not available to the home-
less. 160 
The dissent next took the majority to task over its use of the 
"purpose of the search" as a factor in evaluating whether Mooney's 
expectation of privacy in the containers was reasonable. 161 Citing 
California v. Ciraolo,162 and Scott v. United States,163 the dissent would 
154 [d. at 631-32. 
155 [d. at 632. 
156 [d. See Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 153 (Conn. 1991). 
157 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 172-73 n.3 (Callahan, j., dissenting); see supra text accompanying 
notes 137-42. 
158 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173 (Callahan, j., dissenting). The dissent called this the "circum-
stances of the searched" prong of the analysis. [d. 
159 [d. 
160 See id. 
161 [d. at 173-74. 
162 476 U.S. 207, 213, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986) (finding purpose of aerial 
surveillance not relevant to whether police conduct was a search). 
163 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978) (finding motive irrelevant in 
assessing objective standard for reasonableness of search). 
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not consider this factor at all in determining whether Mooney had 
any reasonable expectation of privacy.I64 The dissent distinguished 
the casesI65 that the majority cited from Mooney's situation. I66 
Though recognizing that the United States Supreme Court through 
these cases has carved out exceptions where the purpose of the 
search is used to establish that the search was reasonable, the dis-
senting judges limited those exceptions where purpose is a valid 
factor to cases examining the question of whether the search was 
reasonable. I67 According to the dissent, Mooney called for examining 
a different issue, namely, whether the inspection of the contents of 
the containers was actually a search, and not whether the search 
was reasonable. I68 Limiting the issue in this way, however, would 
not resolve Mooney's claim of expectation of privacy because 
[t]he [F]ourth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution 
poses two substantive questions about governmental searching. 
The first, what is a search?, might be called the amendment's 
"reach" and could be restated: what general type of govern-
mental activity is this amendment interested in scrutinizing and 
regulating? The second and logically subsequent question-
which searches are unreasonable?-might be termed the 
amendment's "grasp" and could be restated: from this universe 
of searches, which are permitted and which prohibited? It is, 
after all, only "unreasonable" searches that the [C]onstitution 
prohibits. 169 
The dissent seemed to limit its analysis of Mooney's constitu-
tional claim to the issue of whether the police conduct fell within 
the reach of the Fourth Amendment. I7o The majority seemed to 
take for granted that a search had occurred, relying on the record 
at trial where the police stated that they took the items into custody 
because they believed they would find evidence to connect Mooney 
to the crime.l7l Unlike the dissent, however, the majority analyzed 
the conduct to see whether the search fell within the grasp of that 
164 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173-74 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
165E.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (finding a prisoner had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in prison cell); see also, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) and 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (the "inventory cases"). 
166 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173-74 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
167/d. 
168/d. 
169 Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. 
L. REv. 383, 383 (1991). 
170 See id.; Mooney, 588 A.2d at 173-74 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
171 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 155-56 n.13. 
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conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 172 Given that even 
the dissent acknowledged that the reason for the search has been 
used to determine when a search is unreasonable, the discussion 
between the majority and minority opinions on this issue seems at 
cross purposes. 
The dissenting judges dedicated much time to addressing the 
issue of a pre textual arrest, claiming that should be considered 
irrelevant because they did not accept that the purpose of the search 
should be a part of the analysis. 173 To this the majority responded 
that the dissent was trying to answer an argument the majority had 
never made. 174 The majority simply countered that Mooney's in-
ability to be at "home" is one factor that society would consider 
influential in the totality of the circumstances analysis of whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed. 175 
IV. CONTRADICTIONS IN HOMELESS RIGHTS 
The court in Mooney, in reaching its conclusion of law, asserted 
its unwillingness to reach a decision that would be premised on "the 
majestic equality of the laws which forbid rich and poor alike to 
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."176 In 
seeking to do justice by its decision, however, the court has also 
raised questions in the minds of homeless advocates regarding the 
effect that Mooney will have on the rights of the homeless. 
A. Mooney As a Double-Edged Sword 
While the Connecticut Supreme Court was deliberating Con-
necticut v. Mooney, many homeless activists hoped the court would 
establish a precedent that would extend Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to the makeshift homes of the homeless. 177 Even though the 
court did not go quite that far, the finding that Mooney had an 
expectation of privacy in his personal possessions did expand the 
rights of the homeless at a time when the United States Supreme 
Court had decided a series of cases tending to restrict Fourth 
172 See id.; see also Berner, supra note 169, at 383. 
173 Mooney, 588 A.2d at 174 (Callahan, j., dissenting). 
174Id. at 160-61 n.17. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. at 161 (quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 91 (Winifred Stephens trans., 
1925». 
177 Murphy, supra note 13, at 21. 
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Amendment protection. 178 '''It's a breath of fresh air to be going in 
the other direction,'" Mooney's attorney commented when the 
court's decision was announced. "'It sends a message that the Con-
stitution applies to everyone. The police here thought they could 
act with impunity because it was a homeless person, but the court 
said no, that this was a human being and he was not without rights 
just because he couldn't afford a house."'179 Mary Coombs, a pro-
fessor of law at the University of Miami School of Law, explained 
her view of the case: 
Did [Mooney] take all the steps he could reasonably have taken 
given his economic situation? The most he was able to do was 
to put his things in closed containers and to signal that this 
belongs to somebody, that it isn't just trash. Here he did every-
thing he could do. The only other thing he could do was to not 
be homeless. ISO 
Some advocates for the homeless, however, even though they 
support Mooney's cause, see this cause as a double-edged sword, 
finding its broader implication disturbing. lSI Many advocates for 
the homeless consider a freeway embankment--or an alleyway, a 
secluded heating grate, an obscure park bench-an unacceptable 
symbol of a home. 182 Tim Harris, director of Jobs With Peace in 
Boston, a group that advocates for more money for housing, health 
care, and education, has said, "It's a double-edged question: if it's 
not a home, the guy has no rights; if it is a home, we're saying it's 
OK for people to live under freeways. I don't think either of those 
answers are [sic] morally justifiable. It's a no-win situation."183 Rob-
ert M. Hayes, founder of the National Coalition for the Homeless 
and an authority on the legal rights of homeless people, considered 
the Mooney decision legally correct, but called it a "miserable, 
178 I d.; see generally Berner, supra note 169. 
179 Murphy, supra note 13, at 21 (quoting Emanuel Margolis' response when he heard of 
the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision). 
180 Calve, supra note 54, at 1. 
lSI John H. Kennedy, Legal Issue: Is A Homeless Man's "Home" A Castle?, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 13, 1991, at 29. 
182 [d. 
183 [d. at 29, 32. "'1 mean,' asked Connecticut Supreme Court Justice David M. Borden 
during [oral argument], 'are we at the point now in our social development where society 
has said the homeless are a permanent part of our landscape, and wherever they live, public 
property or not, they are at their residence?' 
'1 think there is a growing development in that direction,' answered Emanuel Margolis, 
state-appointed lawyer for Mooney. '1 think that we are in an evolving time, insofar as that 
issue is concerned.'" [d. at 32. 
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wretched right to win" because of its suggestion of the social accep-
tance of homelessness as a fact of life, a fact that Hayes said "should 
be resisted to the grave."184 Hayes recognized that the decision will 
protect some people from further violations beyond those caused 
by homelessness itself, but felt little comfort in knowing that home-
less people's belongings possess some Fourth Amendment protec-
tion when, as he put it, "both the people and the possessions should 
be inside."185 
Still other commentators assert that for the court to conclude 
that Mooney's expectation of privacy in his makeshift home was 
illegitimate is to conclude that "only propertied people, who can 
afford ... a residence, can legitimately expect the Government to 
respect their constitutional right to privacy in their abode by ob-
taining a search warrant before entering. The constitutional right 
to be free from illegitimate searches should not have to be pur-
chased with mortgage payments or rent."186 
B. Anti-Homeless Legislation 
Police in cities across the country enforce legislation that pro-
hibits people from sleeping on the streets or sidewalks, or from 
remaining in public parks after hours.187 Consider, for example, 
People v. Davenport. 188 In Davenport, the county of Santa Barbara 
sought to uphold the constitutionality and enforcement of a mu-
nicipal ordinance that provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person 
to sleep in (1) Any public park during the period of time from 
10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M.; (2) Any public street; (3) Any public 
parking lot or public area, improved or unimproved; or (4) Any 
184 Margolick, supra note 55, at 26. 
185 Johnson, supra note 13, at B6. 
186 Deborah A. Geier, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at A30. For the view 
that Fourth Amendment protection of the homeless should focus on whether society in any 
given locale has accepted homelessness as a cultural norm, see Elizabeth Schutz, Note, The 
Fourth Amendment Rights of the Homeless, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1028-31 (1992). Such a 
standard, however, would amount to discriminatory application of Fourth Amendment rights 
for the homeless on the basis, or the lack thereof, of snobbery. See id. For an elucidation of 
a standard based on private activities as opposed to private places, see Michael D. Granston, 
Note, From Private Places to Private Activities: Toward a New Fourth Amendment House for the 
Shelterless, 101 YALE LJ. 1305, 1326-30 (1992). 
187 See Baker, supra note 3, at 418-19. Baker describes this type of legislation as a clash 
of competing interests, with the homeless' need to perform fundamental life activities on one 
side of the arena, pitted against the non-homeless' desire to use public facilities without 
encountering the unsightly. [d. at 419. 
188 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10,222 Cal. Rptr. 736 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1141-42 (1986). 
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public beach during the period of time from 10:00 P.M. to 6:00 
A.M."189 The court of appeals overturned the municipal court's 
finding of unconstitutionality, stating "it is clear that the sleeping to 
which this ordinance was directed was of the general kind, which 
enjoys no peculiar constitutional advantage .... [T]he government 
can constitutionally prohibit overnight sleeping in public areas as 
part of its broad police powers."190 In effect, the ordinance bans 
sleeping in public in a manner that effectively criminalizes home-
lessness. 191 Using the analogy of drivers who pull off the road to 
sleep in public places rather than risk their own and others' lives 
by dangerous driving, the Davenport court stated that "the law does 
not exonerate one who forces an election between evils and chooses 
the lesser of the tWO."192 The court concluded by noting that because 
one of the legitimate purposes of the ordinance was the protection 
of the sleeping transient, the ordinance viewed the homeless as 
victim rather than as culprit. 193 
Enforcing anti-homeless legislation, however, provides only a 
temporary solution to the perceived problems that the legislation 
seeks to assuage. 194 Police arrest the homeless for minor offenses 
like sleeping in the park, but then generally release them after 
several hours.195 Enforcing these laws actually avoids solving the 
problem of homelessness because enforcement merely encourages 
the homeless to relocate from one city to another. 196 Some cities 
have actively sought to further the relocation of the city's homeless 
onto someone else's shoulders by offering the homeless free, one-
way airplane and bus tickets. 197 
The types of constitutional issues raised in cases like Davenport 
have received inconsistent judicial treatment. One approach is that 
189 Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 13,22 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (citing SANTA BARBARA, 
CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 15.16.085 (1986) (known as the City's "sleeping ordinance")). 
190 Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 15, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 738. 
191 Hayes, supra note 55, at 545. 
192 Davenport, 176 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 16,222 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (quoting United States 
v. Hogue, 752 F.2d 1503, 1505 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
193 See id. 
194 Baker, supra note 3, at 426. 
195Id. 
196Id. 
197Id. at 424 n.40 (footnote references: Michele DiGirolamo, Plan to Bus Homeless Out of 
Town Questioned, UPI, Dec. 5, 1989, available in LEX IS, Nexis Library, UPI File (citing an 
Atlantic City, N.]. councilwoman's plan to give one-way bus tickets to homeless people); 
Suburbs Shipping Their Homeless to Philadelphia, UPI, Feb. 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, UPI File (asserting that suburbs send homeless to Philadelphia against their will); 
Sally Johnson, Homeless Get Ticket to Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988, at 52 (describing 
Vermont property owner's offer to fund one-way tickets for the homeless to leave town)). 
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of the Davenport court. Other courts have found such sleeping or-
dinances unconstitutional and have struck them down as vague and 
overbroad. 1g8 
As legislatures continue to promulgate anti-homeless regula-
tions, the legislation will continue to restrict the activities that the 
homeless can perform on public properties. As one commentator 
has said: 
What is emerging-and it is not just a matter of fantasy-is a 
state of affairs in which a million or more citizens have no place 
to perform elementary human activities like urinating, washing, 
sleeping, cooking, eating and standing around. Legislators voted 
for by people who own private places in which they can do all 
these things are increasingly deciding to make public places 
available only for activities other than these primal human tasks. 
The streets and subways, they say, are for commuting from 
home to office. They are not for sleeping; sleeping is something 
one does at home. The parks are for recreations like walking 
and informal ball-games, things for which one's own yard is a 
little too confined. Parks are not for cooking or urinating, again, 
these things one does at home. Since the public and the private 
are complementary, the activities performed in public are to be 
the complement of those appropriately performed in private. 
This complementarity works fine for those who have the benefit 
of both sorts of places. However, it is disastrous for those who 
must live their whole lives on common land .... [I]t is one of 
the most callous and tyrannical exercises of power in modern 
times by a (comparatively) rich and complacent majority against 
a minority of their less fortunate fellow human beings. 199 
Anti-homeless legislation simply widens the gulf between "them that 
have" and "them that have not." 
C. Other Cases Furthering Rights of the Homeless 
Although Connecticut v. Mooney is the first case that discusses 
the precise issue of Fourth Amendment protection in the personal 
property of the homeless, it merely provides one more example 
of the emerging jurisprudence in the area of the rights of the 
198 See Florida v. Penley, 276 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 281 
So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1984) (striking down ordinance prohibiting sleeping upon or in any street, 
park, wharf, or other public place). See generally Paul Ades, The Unconstitutionality of"Antih-
omeless" Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right 
to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1989); Baker, supra note 3. See also infra notes 200-227 and 
accompanying text. 
199 Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 301-02 
(1991). 
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homeless.2oo A federal judge in New York, for example, has ruled 
that for purposes of voter registration, even a park bench can be a 
"home," as homeless persons establish a legal residence via an out-
of-doors "domicile."201 In Pitts v. Black,202 a group of homeless per-
sons brought a class action suit, based on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, against the city of New York 
because the City's Board of Elections refused to allow the homeless 
to register to vote on the ground that the homeless lacked a legal 
residence.203 The City Board of Elections took the position that the 
state's election statute required that an applicant have a "right to the 
physical location, to the property," in order for that location to be 
properly considered a residence.204 The city claimed that the re-
striction was necessary in order to ensure that voters have a verifi-
able nexus to the community, to prevent fraudulent voting practices, 
and to provide administrative feasibility.205 The court, however, 
found the city's standard too restrictive and, subsequently, violative 
of the homeless applicants' right to participate in elections.206 As a 
result, homeless individuals who identify "a specific location within 
a political community which they consider their home base, to which 
they return regularly, manifest an intent to remain for the present, 
and a place from which they can receive messages and be con-
tacted," satisfy the standard for establishing a domicile for purposes 
of voter registration. 207 
Other states have recognized similar rights in the area of voter 
registration. Via a consent decree, a Federal District Court in Phil-
adelphia gave the homeless the right to vote by allowing them to 
list the address of a shelter as their residence.208 The District of 
200 Margolick, supra note 55, at 25-26 (quoting Robert M. Hayes, National Coalition for 
the Homeless). 
201 See Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696, 708-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
202 Id. For a more thorough discussion of the case, see David L. Rosendorf, Note, 
Homelessness and the Uses of Theory: An Analysis of Economic and Personality Theories of Property 
in the Context of Voting Rights and Squatting Rights, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 701, 717-22 (1991). 
See generally Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Validity, Under Federal Constitution, of State Resi-
dency Requirements for Voting in Elections, 31 L. Ed. 2d 861 (1973). 
205 Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 697-98. The courts of New York have interpreted the term 
"residence" to be equivalent to "domicile," and "dependent upon the applicant'S expressed 
intent, his conduct, and all attendant surrounding circumstances." [d. at 698 n.3 (quoting 
Palla v. Suffolk Co. Bd. of Elections, 286 N .E.2d 247, 251 (1972». 
204 /d. at 698 (emphasis added). 
205 Id. at 699. 
206 See id. at 708-09. 
207 Id. at 710. 
208 See id. at 708 (citing Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v. 
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Columbia as well has made provisions for the homeless to register 
to vote by allowing them to specify a location where they intend to 
remain.209 More recently, the New Jersey Attorney General issued 
an opinion indicating that a homeless person who regularly sleeps 
on a particular park bench can qualify for a voter registration 
card.210 
Homeless advocates offer two rationales for ensuring the voting 
rights of the homeless.211 First, the exercise of voting rights empow-
ers the homeless politically.212 Though some commentators have 
criticized this rationale as unjustified by results to date, homeless 
individuals' lack of political "clout" is no justification for denying 
them the right to vote.213 Second, society's concept of individuality 
encompasses the right to participate in politics as a means of self-
identification and freedom.214 The ability to vote is an end in itself, 
given that "the inherent value of the right to vote is considered as 
separate from what tangible results might be achieved through the 
exercise of such [a] right."215 
In addition to ensuring access to the voting booth, some courts 
are establishing for the homeless other protections such as prohib-
iting the destruction of their belongings in police sweeps to "clean 
up" the streets, or declaring that the homeless have a right to shelter. 
A federal judge in Miami ruled that police sweeps of homeless 
belongings were in contempt of an earlier injunction.216 In Pottinger 
v. Miami,217 homeless advocates, in a class action suit, are seeking to 
stop the continual harassment and arrests218 of the homeless in 
Tartaglione, No. 84-3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984) (unreported order)); Rosendorf, supra 
note 202, at 717 n.94. 
209 See Rosendorf, supra note 202, at 717 n.94 (citing In re Jenkins, slip op. (District of 
Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, June 7, 1984)). 
210 Mark Curriden, Homeless Privacy Rights: Court Requires Warrant for Search of Duffel Bag 
Hidden Under Bridge, 77 A.B.A.]. 33 (1991) (referring to the Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of New jersey's Formal Opinion No.2, Apr. 17, 1991, Voter Registration of 
Homeless Persons (available in LEXIS, N.]. Library, AG File, 1991 N.J. AG LEXIS 2). 
211 See Rosendorf, supra note 202, at 721-22. 
212Id. at 721. 
21' !d. 
214Id. 
215Id. at 722. 
216 Curriden, supra note 210, at 33 (citing Pottinger v. Miami, No. 88-2406-CVI-ATKINS 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1991) (unreported order)). 
217 No. 88-2406-CVI-ATKINS (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1991) (unreported order). For a more 
thorough discussion of the Pottinger case, see Baker, supra note 3, at 457-63. 
218 Harassment included arrests for disorderly conduct; public intoxication; loitering in 
public places; standing, sitting, or sleeping on the sidewalks; and sleeping in parks. See Baker, 
supra note 3, at 457 n.~41. 
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downtown Miami.219 The complaint alleges that the police custom-
arily seize and destroy the personal property of the homeless, in-
cluding "identification, clothing, medication, food and bedding."22o 
Although the court granted a preliminary injunction proscribing 
the destruction of the homeless' property, the police continued in 
the practice.221 The court subsequently held the City of Miami in 
civil contempt for the burning and destruction of the homeless' 
property that the City had performed in the name of "clean-up."222 
Callahan v. Carey established a right to shelter for the homeless in 
New York.223 Relying on the state's constitution, which sought to 
promote the care and support of the needy and declared that such 
needs would be provided for by the state, the homeless succeeded 
in obtaining an injunction directing the state to furnish meals and 
lodging to homeless men who applied for shelter.224 The New York 
courts, however, never actually have decided that a right to shelter 
is a fundamental right under the state's constitution.225 In Maticka 
v. City of Atlantic City,226 on the basis of a statutory obligation found 
in the New Jersey General Public Assistance Law, homeless persons 
in New Jersey succeeded in prohibiting the state from denying them 
shelter solely because of their inability to furnish a permanent res-
idence.227 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the Mooney court emphasized in its oplmon, its holding 
applies to the unique factual circumstances of the case, "where the 
closed containers were found by the police in a secluded place that 
they knew the defendant regarded as his home, where the defen-
dant's absence ... was due to his arrest ... by the police, and where 
219 [d. at 457. 
220 [d. at 458 n.242. 
221 [d. at 459 n.243. 
222 [d.; see also Miami Lawsuit Seeks to Give Homeless a Legal Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 
20, 1992, at L23. 
22. No. 42582 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 5, 1979) (cited in Robert C. Coates, Legal Rights of 
Homeless Americans, 24 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 297, 309 (1990». Eldridge v. Koch expanded the 
Callahan decision. 118 Misc. 2d 163,459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd in part, 98 A.D.2d 
675,469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1983). 
224 Coates, supra note 223, at 310. 
225 [d. at 310-11; see also Patricia Siebert, Homeless People: Establishing Rights to Shelter, 4 
L. & INEQ. J. 393, 397 (1986) (no constitutional right to adequate housing). 
226 524 A.2d 416 (N.J. App. Div. 1987). 
227 Coates, supra note 223, at 311. 
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the purpose of the search was to obtain evidence .... "228 As one 
commentator has said, this decision is hardly a primer on expansive 
constitutional interpretation. 229 Because the court tied the decision 
so specifically to the circumstances of the case, the impact for other 
homeless people in Connecticut and nationally remains unclear. 230 
Nevertheless, the opinion did result in David Mooney's case being 
remanded for a new trial-one in which the evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment would not be available for the 
State's case.231 
The United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari to Con-
necticut v. Mooney has prevented the Connecticut Supreme Court's 
analysis from receiving critical assessment within the context of 
judicial review. Many United States Supreme Court commentators 
feel that the Court of late has been backing away from the sweeping 
protection of individual liberties established during the Court's War-
ren era. 232 Therefore, had the Court granted certiorari, it is doubt-
ful that the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision would have been 
upheld. Even if the United States Supreme Court had granted 
Connecticut v. Mooney review and declared that the Connecticut Su-
preme Court had erred in extending Fourth Amendment protec-
tion on the facts of the case, the decision would not have ended 
Mooney's claims. The Connecticut Supreme Court has found in the 
past that the state constitution's Article 1, Section 7,233 encompasses 
228 Connecticut v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 155 (Conn. 1991). 
229 Calve, supra note 54, at I. 
230 Johnson, supra note 13, at B6. 
231 The result of the Mooney decision raises a point regarding the administration of justice 
that was addressed in United States v. Scott, 766 F. Supp. 629, 631 (D. Mass. 1991). Mooney 
established an expectation of privacy in items that had been used as evidence in support of 
a murder conviction. It is important to recognize, however, that the case, in extending Fourth 
Amendment protection to Mooney's belongings, does not stand for the proposition that 
"society would approve of a putative defendant's efforts to [suppress) potentially incriminat-
ing evidence." Id. 
Mooney did not receive a new trial; he plea-bargained instead. See supra note 13. 
232 See generally Berner, supra note 169; Craig S. Michalk, Note, Alabama v. White: The 
Supreme Court's Latest Attack on Fourth Amendment Protection Against Warrantless Searches, 16 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 333 (1991); Brennan, supra note 54. See also the hypothetical Supreme 
Court opinion written by Professor Wayne LaFave (called the "patron saint of the search and 
seizure law" in Juarez v. Texas, 758 S.W.2d 772, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988» entitled, A 
Fourth Amendment Fantasy: The Last (Heretofore Unpublished) Search and Seizure Decision of the 
Burger Court, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 669 (1986). 
233 Article I, Section 7, of the Connecticut State Constitution reads, "The people shall 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or 
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue 
without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath 
or affirmation." 
118 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:87 
broader protection than does the Fourth Amendment.234 If the 
United States Supreme Court had struck down Mooney's Fourth 
Amendment protection, perhaps the Connecticut Supreme Court 
would then have found a broader protection based on the state 
constitution.235 
The Mooney court could have gone further if it had found a 
constitutionally protected interest in the bridge abutment area,236 
or if it had specifically established that, although not applicable to 
Mooney's situation, it would be willing to concede other fact-specific 
situations in which the homeless would have Fourth Amendment 
protection in their "homes."237 Advocates for the homeless, how-
ever, fear that if society takes the step of finding acceptable that an 
alleyway or a space under a bridge abutment is a "home" deserving 
of privacy, then by corollary society will find homelessness accept-
able and will no longer seek a solution. 
Connecticut v. Mooney asserts that the constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures need not be pur-
chased with rent or mortgage payments.238 Though homeless rights 
advocates may legitimately fear that the Mooney decision is a further 
indication of society's acceptance of homelessness as a cultural 
norm, one can argue that the role of the courts in this area is the 
protection of civil rights, and not the resolution of the social 
234 In Connecticut v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498, 506 (Conn. 1985), the Connecticut Supreme 
Court established that the state constitution "affords more substantive protection to citizens 
than does the [F]ourth [A]mendment to the [F]ederal [C]onstitution in the determination of 
probable cause." The court affirmed this increased protection in Connecticut v. Morrill, 534 
A.2d 1165, 1169 (Conn. 1987). 
235 See generally Daniel R. Gordon, Progressives Retreat: Falling Back from the Federal Con-
stitution to State Constitutions, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801 (1991); Brennan, supra note 54. 
236 For an expansion of this argument, see Royer, supra note 8, at 454-61. 
237 While a court is not likely to extend [F]ourth [A]mendment protection to such 
openly public places as park benches or subway grates, lawyers say other more 
secluded spots where the homeless call home may deserve such protection. 
Ironically, some homeless shun shelters and seek their own space outdoors 
because of privacy. In many shelters, workers by necessity check for drugs and 
weapons and require them to shower and sleep side-by-side with people they neither 
choose nor trust. "And that's why people sleep under bridges, to get that privacy 
back," says Stewart Guernsey, a lawyer and executive director of Second Home, 
which provides shelter and low-cost housing in Boston and Cambridge. 
Kennedy, supra note 181, at 32. 
Constitutional law scholar, Laurence Tribe, commented on Mooney, saying that "while 
propertied men wrote the U.S. Constitution, the document encompasses rights they would 
never have dreamed possible. And a more expansive view of [F]ourth [A]mendment protec-
tion would be warranted to encompass the situations of some homeless." ld. at 32. 
238 See Geier, supra note 186, at A30. 
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problem of homelessness. Given that mandate, Connecticut v. Mooney 
was correctly decided. The major success of the case was in taking 
one small step toward refining individual civil rights apart from 
property ownership principles, thus helping to chip away at an 
obstacle the law tends to impose on the property-poor homeless. 
Kathleen Marie Quinn 

